By Lenin Tinashe Chisaira
My new paper: '#AfCFTA 2018: The Continental Free Trade Area, Neo-Liberalism and Africa's Resource Curses' appears in the Young African Leaders Journal of Development #YALJOD Vol II:2018
Monday 10 December 2018
Wednesday 21 November 2018
Reflections from #WorldChildrensDay (20 November)
Reflections from #WorldChildrensDay (20 November): When I visited Kuntah Kinteh Island, The Gambia. My guide took time to show me a school he founded. Bravo for building a world where every child is in school and learning, safe from harm and able to fulfil their potential.
Wednesday 5 September 2018
Zimbabwe’s 2018 elections: The end of a neoliberal beauty contest and the way forward
[First published, 18 August 2018 on Pambazuka News]
The historic Zimbabwe presidential and parliamentary “harmonised’ elections of 30 July 2018 have just been concluded. The final results tally saw President Emmerson Mnangagwa getting 2,460,463 votes (50.8 per cent), ahead of his nearest rival Nelson Chamisa who got 2,147,436 votes (44.3 per cent). The 50.8 per cent by the President meant he scrapped above the legal 50 per cent plus one vote necessary to avoid a run-off election.
 |
| President Emmerson Mnangagwa (left) and Nelson Chamisa (right) (Image: thezimbabwemail.com) |
The 2018 elections will be remembered as the year where the opposition and the ruling party for the first time, behaved as Siamese twins in terms of presenting an equally neo-liberal economic outlook and for exhibiting similar problems with internal democracy as well as for calling for divine interventions in their political campaigns. On the last point, the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) ran under the prayer line “The voice of the people is the Voice of God” while the main opposition Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC-A) used the phrase “God is in it”.
No ideological differences in the neoliberal ruling and opposition parties
However, as the results from the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) trickled in, it became almost certain that the ruling ZANU-PF party of President Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa (75) was headed for a landslide re-election. The main opposition MDC-A led by lawyer and Christian pastor Nelson Chamisa (40) was headed for a defeat. A perusal of the manifestos, however, makes the reader go at pains to see any differences in the politics and ideas of the two main parties. They went at length to embrace and campaign on the ideals of neo-liberal capitalist aspirations.
The manifestos of the two main parties seemed to be corporate strategy documents. For instance, in terms of neo-liberal economics, the ZANU-PF manifesto described its New Dispensation governable model in the following words:
“We are now in a New Dispensation under the leadership of ZANU-PF, where focus and preoccupation of the new administration is opening up the country for business…and promoting investment, economic empowerment and realigning to an investor-friendly trajectory that leads to economic growth…”[[i]].
Neo-liberal economists openly fronted the MDC-A, which strangely started off as a worker-led party but at the time of the elections, was led by neoliberal lawyers, economists and business people also issued a lengthy manifesto in the run-up to the election. The manifesto indicated that the Alliance transformation markers in government would include the following very neo-liberal economic measures:
Restoration of the land market and the issuance of title deeds to beneficiaries of the land reform programme;
Promotion of foreign direct investment and foreign portfolio investment through the enactment of a new foreign investment law and the ease of doing business [[ii]].
In hindsight, these opposition neo-liberal measures, notably a land market, were going to be rejected by the majority rural based farming and peasant communities. According to the 2012 census, 67 per cent of Zimbabwe’s population lives in the countryside, while 33 per cent is urban-based (See also, the ZEC Final Report on Biometric Voter Registration). In addition to anti-peasant policies, the opposition’s obsession with “ease of doing business” reforms (which are synonyms for anti-labour justice measures and laissez-faire economics) were out of sync with the ideals of a formerly workers’ party.
With the MDC-A, the tragedy was that workers and trade unions elites such as the leadership of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) still believed that the party was pro-working class. This illusion persisted despite the involvement of the party leadership in anti-working class labour matters such as the Zuva Judgement of 2015 [[iii]]. The judgement made it easier for employers to dismiss employees. In 2018, the lawyers who worked on the case on the employer’s side became the leading candidates and legal advisors of the 2018 MDC-A campaign. This removal of such illusions and the reclaiming of the opposition voice by the working class is the primary task for anti-neoliberal forces in the post- 2018 election season.
Foreign policy: Seeking to be willing servants of Western states
The elections exposed a desire by both parties to be puppets of Western capitals. The opposition was at pains to align itself to the Americans while the ruling party sought to endear itself to the erstwhile British colonial power. These alliances may likely have future implications on the state’s foreign policy as former allies like the Peoples Republic of China and Russia will seek to maintain the hold they have had during the days of Western-imposed isolation and economic, political sanctions that were occasioned by the anti-imperialist rhetoric of former President Robert Mugabe.
The campaign period, by extension, started the moment the former President Robert Mugabe resigned following a military-led popular uprising in November 2017[[iv]]. On the international relations level, the campaign saw the two main candidates and parties going all out to seek the friendship of Western capitalist capitals. Mnangagwa went all out to court the annual World Economic Forum meeting at Davos, Switzerland and made pledges to re-join the Commonwealth grouping of ex-British colonies. The ZANU-PF Manifesto openly celebrated this:
“Cde Mnangagwa’s astuteness and principled stance on the role of the private sector in national development has seen him become the first Zimbabwean President to be invited to the prestigious 2018 World Economic Forum in the Swiss Alps at Davos [[v]].
In the main opposition camp, the foreign policy was a bit of the dramatic and the non-strategic. The opposition indicated “neutrality”:
“The MDC-A government will pursue a conservative foreign policy in respect of which it will remain non-aligned and will seek to make friends with every decent state in the world, that shares its values of democracy, constitutionalism, socially just transparency, openness and inclusivity”[[vi]].
Their actions, however, highlighted lack of competence to deal with foreign matters in the contemporary world. For instance, there was explicit support from the MDC-A for the problematic State of Israel. Nelson Chamisa even made a probably ill-advised “private” trip to Israel in the midst of the campaign [[vii]]. The pro-Israel sentiments further went against the grain of most African and progressive states outside Africa. This global political stance can be seen by, for instance, how the world voted against Israel/United States in the 2017 United Nations General Assembly Resolution on Jerusalem [[viii]]. All this was lost on the opposition and its campaign and policy advisors.
Furthermore, Nelson Chamisa and the MDC-A principals like Tendai Biti and Jacob Ngarivhume made trips to the Capitol Hill in Washington, DC pledging to be the future blue-eyed boys of American capital. Following the trips, at one of his ill-fated rallies in the diamond-rich Manicaland Province, Nelson Chamisa made a far-fetched, amateurish and non-strategic claim that United States President Donald Trump promised the opposition a US $15 billion-dollar victory present [[ix]].
In a nutshell, the foreign policies of both parties were neo-liberal in outlook. However, the opposition party was less strategic and ill-advised in its policy aspirations and conduct.
The way forward for the anti-neoliberal movement
The 2018 elections helped to open the eyes of the anti-neoliberal movement. The elections showed that the major parties of the moment in Zimbabwe are ideological twins. Hence only the building of a new alternative can at least represent the anti-neoliberal aspirations of the Zimbabwean people. The 2018 elections, therefore, present opportunities for the left in many ways. There is need for the continued perusal of the ZANU-PF and MDC-A manifestos to remove illusions from the ordinary peoples. Exposing the similar neo-liberal aspirations of the two main parties to the people is warranted.
Real leftists, to borrow from the words of Amilcar Cabral, must: “Hide nothing from the masses of our people. Tell no lies. Expose lies whenever they are told. Mask no difficulties, mistakes, failures. Claim no easy victories...”[[x]]. Such political measures will assist in the building of a new anti-neoliberal and anti-capitalist alternative for Zimbabwe and Southern Africa. The new movement should have safeguards from the beginning against the ideological infiltration and opportunism that have become the gravediggers of both the liberation era ZANU-PF party and the former worker-led MDC party.
* Lenin Tinashe Chisaira is a writer, lawyer, researcher and socialist based in Harare, Zimbabwe. He is currently studying International Human Rights and Public Policy at the University College Cork, Ireland.
Endnotes
[i] ZANU-PF, The People’s Manifesto 2018, p.1
[ii] MDC-A, New Zimbabwe Pledge For A Sustainable And Modernisation Agenda For Real Transformation, p. 26.
[iii] Nyamande & Another v Zuva Petroleum (Pvt) Ltd (SC 281/14) [2015] ZWSC 43.
[iv] See Chisaira LT, “Zimbabwe’s November 2017 Military Action: A Critique on Constitutionalism, Liberation Armies and Political Realities”, CCJHR blog, Ireland, 22 November 2017.
[v] ZANU-PF, The People’s Manifesto 2018, p. 5.
[vi] MDC-A, New Zimbabwe Pledge For A Sustainable And Modernisation Agenda For Real Transformation, p. 25
[vii] See The Standard, “Chamisa goes to Israel”, 1 July 2018.
[viii] Al Jazeera, “UN Jerusalem resolution: How each country voted”, 21 Dec 2017.
[ix] Business Daily, “MDC-A apologises for Chamisa $15bn lie”, 4 February 2018.
[x] Cabral (1969), Revolution in Guinea: Selected Texts.
Monday 7 May 2018
Reflections from the Exercise Viking18 on civil-military cooperation in multinational crisis response and peace operations
The Exercise Viking18 on civil-military cooperation in crisis response and peace operations was conducted from 16th – 26th April 2018 at sites in Brazil, Bulgaria, Finland, Ireland, Serbia and Sweden, with over 2,500 military personnel and civilian humanitarians simultaneously working on the same fictitious scenario in real-time. The Swedish Armed Forces are the primary coordinator and host of the exercise, in conjunction with the Folke Bernadotte Academy (the Swedish agency for peace, security and development). The Viking training exercises are held every four years; therefore 2018 was an opportune time for the dozen law and international relations students from University College Cork who applied and got selected to participate in the exercise. It was an informative and hectic week for students interested in international humanitarian law.
The exercise is conducted in real-time. The Exercise Viking focused on the fictional State of Bogaland, whose map, however, is modelled on Sweden. There is an excellent level of seriousness from both military, police and civilian participants and that makes the whole exercise worthwhile. The Exercise Viking indeed develops a sense of ‘on the ground’ experience for all participants.
In Ireland, the exercise was conducted at Custume Barracks in Athlone, County Westmeath. The participating UCC team was joined by other students from University College Dublin and NUI Maynooth. Students were divided amongst dedicated Irish Aid mentors, and they participated in the simulated ground operations of some humanitarian aid agencies. These agencies included the Red Cross, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UN Mission in Bogaland (UNMIB), the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and non-governmental organisations (NGO).
As UCC students, we had some helpful prior pieces of training in Cork, conducted by our UCC coordinators Dr Dug Cubie from the School of Law and Dr David Fitzgerald from the School of History. We also had a briefing from Comdt Laura Fitzpatrick, from the Defence Forces Ireland. She is also the Chief Instructor at the United Nations Training School Ireland (UNTSI).
As a participant, I was first deployed to the Red Cross office and then to the OCHA office due to the availability of experienced mentors. My day during the exercise would start at 0700hrs each morning with breakfast and then going over the events of the previous night. Information was shared via email, telephone and especially dedicated social media and newspapers. I would draft emails to seek clarity on specific issues with the military side of the exercise.
There were also daily briefing meetings. As a participant, I attended the OCHA briefing meetings with humanitarian agencies where we planned activities such as the deployment of secure aid convoys to disaster-affected regions of Bogaland. This participation in meetings was very informative as it informed how civilians and the military should communicate in a conflict zone.
I also managed to attend some army briefings as an observer, notably the morning Commanders Briefing and the Operations Briefing. During the Commanders Briefing, leaders of each army unit from intelligence, operations, legal and others would brief the commander about the situation on the ground and discuss the planned activities for the next 24 hours. This method was also the situation with the Operations Briefing.
On the overall, the Exercise Viking was a critical and practical element to my LLM experience in Ireland. I imagine that it was similarly helpful and practical for all the other participating students, civilian, police and military personnel from around the world. It added a real-world dimension on what life and interaction would be like in a humanitarian situation, in conflict areas.
The only downside is that the exercise is only held every 3-4 years, which means such an opportunity would only be availed to students and other stakeholders in the year 2021.
Sunday 25 March 2018
Six Political Facts concerning the Zimbabwe Election 2018
It has been long since I visited this blog, mainly as a result of settling in Ireland for my studies and also being away from Zimbabwe. However, I have made some observations which I ought to share about the Zimbabwe Election in 2018. The contest is likely to take place in the period between June and August 2018. The main contestants seem set to be President Emmerson Mnangwagwa of Zanu-Pf and Nelson Chamisa of the MDC Alliance. Anyway here are my six political facts.
1: The Zimbabwe election 2018 is an election without an alternative. ED will woo UK-based, and Chamisa will woo US-based capitalists. Only opportunists see a choice between the two.
 |
| MDC Alliance leaders Nelson Chamisa (far left) and Tendai Biti (third from left) reporting to the US Congress in Washington DC (December 2017) |
2: Zanu PF has purged economic empowerment factions and any semblance of progressive economic policies and seeks to overturn its own land reform programme.
 |
| President Emmerson Mnangagwa with International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Managing DirectorChristinene Lagarde at the WEF 2018. |
3: MDC Alliance has purged workers from leadership. I struggle to find ex-trade unionists with any real power in the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions-formed opposition party. Now its led by wealthy lawyers and business consultants
4: Prez Emmerson Mnangagwa and Nelson Chamisa have been in the same government before. That is in the Government of National Unity (2008-2013). Both have been around for at least 15 years in Parliament or Government in Zimbabwe
5: Both Zanu-PF and MDC Alliance use and abuse excitable and unemployed youths under the hashtags #EDhasMyVote and #GenerationalConsensus respectively.
 |
| Zanu-Pf youths dance at the launch of the #EDHasMyVote Campaign in Harare. |
 |
| MDC Alliance #GenerationalConsensus organisers |
6: In the Zimbabwe 2018 elections there is nothing new & whoever wins, the country is headed for a period of human rights abuse, social and economic disaster. The hope is in progressive activists and campaigns fighting back.
_____
Follow on Twitter @LeninChisaira
Sunday 26 November 2017
Zimbabwe's November 2017 Military Action: A Critique on Constitutionalism, Liberation Armies and Political Reality
First posted on the Centre for Criminal Justice and Human Rights, UCC, Ireland blog here.
1. INTRODUCTION
From the time on 13 November 2017, when Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF), General Constantino Chiwenga issued a press statement ostensibly protesting against purges occurring in the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) party, there were debates, justifications and criticisms concerning military interference in the affairs of a civilian government. On 15 November 2017, a mere two days after the General’s statement, the ZDF blockaded the centres of State power in Zimbabwe’s capital Harare although insisting that the actions were not a military takeover of government. The centres of state power are contained in a few colonial era-buildings clustered around the Anglican (Church of England) Cathedral of St Mary’s and All Saints in Harare, the proximity to the Church bearing testimony of the country’s colonial past. The buildings that were barricaded include the President’s and Cabinet meeting offices at Munhumutapa Building (Executive); the High Court, Supreme Court and Constitutional Courts mainly housed in the Mapondera Building opposite Munhumutapa (Judiciary) and the Parliament Buildings (Legislative). The ZDF military action was code-named “Operation Restore Legacy” and resulted in the eventual resignation of President Robert Gabriel Mugabe and the nomination of former Vice President Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa as Mugabe’s successor.
The ZDF relied on the preamble to the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe to justify military intervention in politics. General Chiwenga indicated that people who had participated in the liberation struggle were being targeted by “counter-revolutionary elements” and hence the Zanu-PF purges signified disrespect for liberation struggles and violated the constitution. The constitutional preamble included the following phrase: “Exalting and extolling the brave men and women who sacrificed their lives during the Chimurenga/Umvukela and national liberation struggles and honouring our forebears and compatriots who toiled for the progress of our country” (ZDF Statement, 13 November 2017) (Constitution of Zimbabwe, preamble, 2013). This was mainly meant to pre-empt other constitutional provisions such as Section 211(3): “The Defence Forces must respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of all persons and be non-partisan, national in character, patriotic, professional and subordinate to the civilian authority as established by this Constitution.” (Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013)
In place of usual protestations aimed at usurpations of democracy and human rights, that usually accompany a coup d'état elsewhere in the world (See for instance the UN statement on the 2009 coup in Honduras), the ZDF military action was seemingly met with reasonable popular support and sighs of relief around the world and in Zimbabwe. The opinion would not be meant to serve as either a vote of confidence or no confidence in the military action, but to make a constitutional and political realist analysis of the ZDF’s actions. The analysis will seek to balance the context of the Zimbabwean political realities and liberation legacies with the dictates of an era of democracy, constitutionalism and human rights.
2. POLITICAL REALITY, DEMOCRACY AND THE END OF THE MUGABE ERA
At both domestic and international level, there was general acceptance of the November 2017 military action. This was mainly as consideration for the unique status of affairs in Zimbabwe where the one-man Robert Mugabe rule has been a feature for the 37 years between 1980 and 2017. On 18 November, thousands of Zimbabweans took to the street in a solidarity march with the ZDF. In addition, in the House of Commons of the United Kingdom, the country’s erstwhile colonial power, the Foreign Secretary issued a statements that “Honourable Members on all sides of the House have taken a deep interest in Zimbabwe for many years – and I pay tribute to the courage and persistence of the Honourable Member for Vauxhall, who has tirelessly exposed the crimes of the Mugabe regime, visiting the country herself during some of its worst moments… Every Honourable Member will follow the scenes in Harare with goodwill and sympathy for Zimbabwe’s long-suffering people”. (Oral statement to Parliament- Situation in Zimbabwe: Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson’s statement, 15 November 2017). Subsequently the leader of Zimbabwe’s neighbour, Republic of Botswana’s President Ian Khama clearly said that: “I don’t think anyone should be President for that amount of time. We are Presidents, we are not monarchs. It’s just common sense” (Reuters)
The November 2017 military action also exposes a number of realities about Zimbabwean politics, or indeed about the politics of post-colonial and post-liberation states. The events invite an analysis of the character and outlook of a liberation army turned into a national defence force as well as the growing acknowledgements of social and economic problems faced by the people of Zimbabwe. The November events reveal the following:
2.1. Identity of the Zimbabwean Defence Forces as a liberation militia
The November 2017 military action highlighted the ZDF as a perennial liberation army that still beholds itself as a continuous product of a political and ideological process. In reality though, the ZDF was crafted from both military and political processes at the end of the Zimbabwean liberation struggle in 1979-80. At independence, the ZDF was built up from two main liberation armies, namely the Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), which were military wings of Zanu-PF (and of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union, ZAPU, which eventually joined Zanu-PF). Some units of the Rhodesian security forces were also amalgamated into the ZDF whilst extreme units of the Rhodesian army such as the Selous Scouts were immediately disbanded. Even during the integration of the armies with professional support from the United Kingdom, there was “some conflict between the agreed nature of the new force under training with Mugabe, whose ZANLA forces had been trained by the Chinese and who wished to adopt a people's militia model on one side, and the British who wished to create a more conventional, professional army” (Jackson: 2011)
Therefore, having originated in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle, the ZDF leadership still views itself as involved in political and ideological warfare against neo-colonialism, as the ZDF Statement of 13 November 2017 shows. The ZDF posture had problems in a democracy where the army was supposed to be a professional entity subordinate to the civilian government. The ZDF desire to be on a footing with the militaries of countries such as the People’s Republic of China where the People’s Liberation Army owes its founding to, and was under the control of, both the state and the Communist Party of China, was a bit misplaced. The ZDF was no longer the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army for starters. Rather the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe clearly provided that: “Neither the security services nor any of their members may, in the exercise of their functions act in a partisan manner or further the interests of any political party or cause.” (Constitution of Zimbabwe, Section 208 (1) and (2))
2.2. Political justifications of defending “the gains of the liberation struggle” and Anti-colonialism
The ZDF statement justifying interference in Zanu-PF politics, on 13 November 2017, stated that “…the Zimbabwe Defence Forces remain the major stockholder in respect to the gains of the liberation struggle and when these are threatened we are obliged to take corrective measures.” This statement conjured memories of past instances when the ZDF command evoked links to the liberation struggle to justify political involvement. The most comparative moment was on the eve of the 2002 Presidential Election when President Robert Mugabe and Zanu-PF were facing their toughest electoral challenge since 1980 at the hands of Morgan Tsvangirai and the newly formed Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party. At that time the then ZDF Commander General Vitalis Zvinavashe issued a statement: “We wish to make it very clear to all Zimbabwean citizens that the security organisations will only stand in support of those political leaders that will pursue Zimbabwean values, traditions and beliefs for which thousands of lives were lost in the pursuit of Zimbabwe’s hard-won independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interests. To this end, let it be known that the highest office in the land is a straitjacket whose occupant is expected to observe the objectives of the liberation struggle. We will therefore not accept, let alone support or salute, anyone with a different agenda that threatens the very existence of our sovereignty” (ZDF Statement, 9 January 2002) (Tendi: 2013).
On the day of the November 2017 military action itself however, contrary to the statement of two days earlier, further reference to the liberation struggle was markedly absent in the ZDF statement read out on the morning of the military action. The ZDF instead justified military intervention in an anti-corruption tone. They stated that their action was targeted at allegedly corrupt cabinet ministers who were mostly pro-Grace Mugabe and these ministers had long been reportedly involved in the corrupt handling of public funds, allocations of public lands and interference with the operations of local governments. In the second ZDF statement therefore, the mission of the military action was stated as: “…targeting criminals around him (President Robert Mugabe) who are committing crimes that are causing social and economic suffering in order to bring them to justice” (ZDF Statement, 15 November 2017). This highlighted that the ZDF was beginning to balance its own interests with the anti-corruption sentiments and interests of the majority of the people.
The ZDF also initially indicated that they were going to take action against “neo-colonialism”. It is widely argued and accepted that Third World countries such as Zimbabwe suffer from unfair economic and political relations with super powers as highlighted by the compositions of multinational institutions such as the United Nations Security Council, World Bank and International Monetary Fund among others. The military action and statements however gave no further helpful or tangible links of evidentiary value between “neo-colonialism” and the perceived “criminal elements” (i.e. cabinet ministers) who were allegedly detained at the KGVI (King George the Sixth) military barracks for interrogation.
2.3. Acknowledgment of Social Economic Problems
In addition to addressing internal Zanu-PF politics, the November 2017 military action events partly sought to acknowledge socio-economic problems faced by the ordinary people. The ZDF 13 November statement stated that “As a result of squabbling within the ranks of Zanu-PF, there has been no meaningful development in the country for the past 5 years. The resultant economic impasse has ushered-in more challenges to the Zimbabwean populace such as cash shortages and rising commodity prices”.
This part of the statement was bound to evoke popular/grassroots support at a time where the country was facing economic and social problems such as cash shortages and administrative onslaught upon vendors and the urban poor. The ZDF addressed issues of concern such as “cash-shortages” and “rising commodity prices.” Throughout the action they also acknowledged the importance of various sectors of Zimbabwean society such as the civil service, the judiciary, the legislators and the youths. These gestures were calculated at endearing the majority of the populace to the military action and judging by the mass marches of 18 November, the tactic worked.
3. EFFECTS OF THE NOVEMBER MILITARY ACTION ON THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ZIMBABWE
The November 2017 military action was still unfolding at the time of the writing. However, events surrounding the action have revealed a number of lessons and insights for the democracy and human rights movements in Zimbabwe and beyond. These include the need for an ever-vigilant and vibrant opposition and civil society sector, the need for clear-headed watchdogs for human rights and constitutionalism during the heady moments of a “revolution” and the need to check the implications of partisan military involvement on the future of democratic politics.
3.1. The failure of mainstream opposition to develop alternative pro-poor economic policies
The main concern for people within Zimbabwe has been on organising around socio-economic challenges. In that regard Zimbabwe had had significant civil society, trade union and students’ movements at various stages of its post-colonial history. However, in the decade since 2005, there has been a marked failure by mainstream opposition parties and most of the civil society to develop pro-poor alternative economic plans. Instead these sectors have developed neo-liberal manifestos and pro-business policy briefs that have never resonated with the majority of the working class populace. In the absence of a pro-people civil society and opposition sector, the ordinary people saw the November military action as the clear salvation against the years of President Robert Mugabe’s economic and policy blunders.
3.2. The palace coup that ended an era and the 2018 elections
The November military action was definitely a palace coup, in that it sought to replace a leader with another member of the elite, namely expelled Vice-President Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa who had the support of the military. The long awaited ouster of President Robert Mugabe would likely remain the major contribution of the action. The military action, was however worrisome considering that the country was going for elections in mid-2018, and as in key Presidential elections in 2002 and 2008, there would likely be tacit support by the military for a Presidential candidate, namely Emerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa. In the past years that involvement was very problematic for the outcomes of the elections and resulted in reports of the military being involved in torture and human rights violations of political opponents to the army’s preferred associated, with in the past has been Robert Mugabe.
3.3. Human rights, democracy and personalisation of the liberation struggle
As indicated before, Zimbabwe remains a product of the liberation struggle. In that regard, the mainstream opposition parties’ reluctant efforts to acknowledge that history has continued to be their downfall especially at elections and mass mobilisation.
The liberation legacy has therefore ben personalised by the Zanu-PF elite, and of late by the military elite. In essence the liberation struggle legacy presupposes any opponent to be a “counter-revolutionary” devoid of human rights. Hence the worrisome military style raids and detentions of cabinet ministers who were deemed to be G40.
4. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the November 2017 “Operation Restore Legacy” military action in Zimbabwe, highlight a state that was going through a social and economic crisis in addition to political uncertainty. These were fertile grounds for elite infighting within the ruling Zanu-PF party where military intervention unwittingly led to the end of the 37 years of the Robert Mugabe presidency, something which democratic elections and protest have failed to do. This was widely welcomed as a small but significant step towards a better and more democratic Zimbabwe. The November 2017 military action, no matter how it would play out to the end, will continue to be an interesting reference to the necessity of balancing demands for human rights, constitutionalism and democracy with an open-minded understanding of political reality.
Tuesday 24 October 2017
Pics: Sakharov Prize Debate 2017 (University College Cork, Ireland)
These pictures were taken at the University College Cork, Ireland on 23 October 2017 . Master of Law students participated to promote human rights issues. This group consisted of Lenin Tinashe Chisaira (Zimbabwe), Mathilde Masmonetil (France) and Hannah Pickens (United States). They were supporting environmental justice and human rights activist Aura Lolita Chavez of Guatemala.
The Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thught is awarded by the European Parliament each year to honour exceptional individuals who combat intolerance, fanaticism and oppression.
The Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thught is awarded by the European Parliament each year to honour exceptional individuals who combat intolerance, fanaticism and oppression.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)